Introduction
The theoretical study of culture across the social science disciplines has long been hampered by a common malady: the tendency to view cultural theories and theories of action as disjointed, or even opposing, modes of analysis. This chapter investigates the nature and causes for this split, then surveys the growth in recent years of diverse attempts at theoretical synthesis. All these syntheses are to some extent interdisciplinary, but because of their origins in widely varying academic communities, they rest on fundamentally different bases. Nonetheless, it will be argued that they share something in common, something that holds promise of collaborative work in what up to now might have been seen as fundamentally incompatible paradigms. Not only has there been work in multiple fields that tends to look at the (mutually) causal relationship between culture and action, but there has been a common recognition in all of these fields that in order to examine this, greater focus has to be placed on the cognitive and motivational activity of the mind as the process through which culture's effect on action is mediated.
There are so many theoretical and methodological approaches that appropriate the word "culture," conceiving of it in so many contradictory ways, that any attempt at survey of all major cultural paradigms in the social sciences is likely to be an exercise in futility. If anything, the number of working definitions of culture in the social sciences has multiplied since Kroeber and Kluckhohn compiled their grand review and critique of 164 definitions over half a century ago (1952) . It is for that reason that, rather than attempting something so grand and ultimately impractical, I have chosen to focus on the particular subset of theoretical innovation that seeks to elucidate the relationship between cultural and action. One thing that past and current definitions share is the idea of culture as a collective phenomenon applied to a particular group or society, whether it is describes consensually held attitudes, a distribution of such attitudes, or an emergent entity that cannot be described as an aggregation of individual attitudes. The chapter examines three major lines of work: The first arises from criticisms, both external and internal, of general predictive theories of action, drawn largely from the rational choice tradition, which are applied primarily in economics, political science, and to some extent sociology. These criticisms have led to a call for a new version of these theories, one that views culture as a primary determinant of the preferences and beliefs upon which decision making rests. The second line of work comes from the interstices of anthropology, psychology, and sociology, particularly the development of mental typologies and models that are used characterize societies and their cultures. Here, the key development has been moving beyond looking at culture as a set of taxonomies, and looking towards the way in which individual-level culture generates models of the world that impel action. The final line of work is the literature on epistemological "standpoints" that, developing from a base of feminist studies, examines the ways in which the structural positions of individuals affects their access to knowledge. This literature has had to deal with the tension between asserting the privileged knowledge of particular groups based on their common culture and recognition of significant differences in standpoints between members within such groups. It is moving towards a solution that recognizes analysis of individual self-construal as the way to sort out such similarities and differences.
Despite the wide differences between these three literatures,indeed it would be difficult to think of three more disparate sources within the social sciences, the distinct characteristic shared by all is that analysis of the relationship between culture and individual action is seen as requiring the approaching of culture in a micro-macro fashion, not only as an attribute of a society as a whole, but in terms of individual qualities. The focus is thus not only on the causal implications of cognitions and motivations for action, but also the social process by which such cognitions and motivations are formed over time by culture, and sometimes on the feedback loop by which actions in turn affect culture. Hence it is possible to see common purposes and even possibilities for integration between these literatures, even if they are typically seen as representing incompatible views on the philosophy of sciences. In this light, it is useful to look at the issues that divide contemporary syntheses, and discuss possibilities for reconciliation. It is not that the unification of all cultural theories of action is necessarily feasible or desirable, but that mutual critique and influence is preferable to parallel development.
Needless to say, even though I will only be surveying a small subset of theoretical work that purports to deal with culture, it is inevitable that huge swathes of literature will be covered in a small amount of space. It is hoped that what is written is not taken as some kind of general (or even partial) critique of these literatures, because it is not intended to be one. Instead, it is an attempt to identify certain trends that seem common to all of them. These trends in turn represent only parts of these literatures, and are often highly contested by older, "mainstream" versions. Nonetheless, the fact that there is significant theoretical movement in each literature towards roughly the same set of goals is notable and favorable to greater unification of the social science approaches to the relationships between culture, cognition, and action.
"Cultural Choice" Approaches
After a long imperialistic march that its most ardent supporters and detractors viewed as having the ultimate goal of becoming the dominant social science paradigm for modeling human action (Radnitzky and Bernholz, 1987; Radnitzky, 1992; Tommasi and Ierulli, 1995) , the rational choice approach has tottered at its moment of seeming triumph, and has faced somewhat of an identity crisis in recent years (Lichbach, 2003; Van den Berg and Meadwell, 2004) . Its basic assumptions have come under question, and critics, many of them internal have begun to question its ability to perform with sufficient accuracy what has always been seen as its main methodological purpose, the general and testable prediction of behavior. As the scope of rational choice analysis has expanded, predictive anomalies and indeterminacies have multiplied. To deal with these problems, a number of "fixes" to the approach have been proposed, many revolving around bringing into analysis the concept of culture, which has traditionally been excluded from rational choice analysis, and indeed giving it pride of place.
Increasing, it is being recognized that cultural analysis, rather than being the antithesis of rational choice (e.g., Barry, 1970) , can coexist and even provide the solution to the paradigmatic crisis that the approach faces, while allowing rational choice to retain its existing theoretical strengths of generality and testability. To begin with however, some terminological issues must be clarified. The term rational choice can be defined into two different ways. A "thin" concept of rationality includes only the notion that an individual has a well ordered set of preferences, logically and probabilistically consistent beliefs, and acts to maximize her preferences in light of those beliefs. This definition of rationality leaves open the question of what these preferences and beliefs are and how they are derived, thus rendering it incapable of making testable predictions. A "thick" concept of rationality makes prediction possible by including a model of preferences and beliefs (Elster, 1983; Taylor, 1989; Ferejohn, 1991) . The problem with the thick concept that has been used in conventional rational choice is that it is based upon a simplistic model of selfregarding materialism and "information" (inference from observation) that is an anomaly-generator in environments that are not dominated by formalized, predictable, and purpose-specific institutions.
Attention to cultural factors can fill in the thick concept of rational choice, yet do so in a way in way that is more realistic than the conventional model of preferences and beliefs. In this way, rational choice and culture, far from being at odds, are actually complementary modes of analysis (Chai, 1997) . Culture allows for assumptions about preferences and beliefs that are not pulled out of the air, but rather based upon sustained empirical studies and inductive generalizations from those studies. However, this requires a way of measuring the cultural milieu. One way of doing this is taking physical and symbolic manifestations of culture, and converting them into internal motivations and cognitions. Another is modeling the generation of "internal" cultural through endogenous models of preference and belief formation.
In economics, investigations of ways to modify the conventional assumptions of rational choice have not only reinvigorated of the field of behavioral economics, but turned it into what is generally recognized as the cutting edge of the economic theory (Camerer et al., 2004; Diamond and Vartiainen, 2007; Fudenberg, 2006; Pesendorfer, 2006) . While behavioral economics comprises a large number of theoretical threads, a major part of its focus has been on modeling the social forces that determine individual preferences, with a particular focus on other-regarding preferences, as well as those towards time discounting and risk.
The first type of preference in particular is the focus of a large literature that looks at the role of cross-national or cross-ethnic cultural differences in determining preferences. Much of this literature is tied into the equally quickly expanding field of experimental economics, which provides much of the empirical data to inform the theories being generated in behavioral economics. The field of "social preferences" Rabin, 2006; Leavitt and List, 2007) has focused on three major ways in which individual preferences can be other-regarding, each with distinct implications for behavior.
The first is perhaps the simplest: altruistic preferences, that is, the tendency to incorporate the welfare of others, whether all or a delimited group of others, into your own preferences over outcomes (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002) . The implications for action are then fairly clear-cut-if one has the opportunity to contribute to a "public good," that is, one that benefits an entire group rather than just the actor alone, altruistic preferences towards that group will raise the incentives to make such a contribution, even when the private benefit of doing so will be exceeded by the costs. It has been long recognized that if such preferences exist, they can help to explain cases where individuals willingly contribute to public goods even when there are opportunities to "free-ride" on the contributions of others (Olson, 1965) , hence overcoming problems of collective action (Collard, 1978; Margolis, 1982; Phelps, 1975; Stark, 1995) . However, only recently has altruism been widely incorporated into mainstream economic theory.
The second major way in which social preferences have been theorized is as embodying a desire for reciprocity ( Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998; Rabin, 1993) , whereby individuals seek to reward those who have helped them in the past and punish those who have hurt them, even when the cost of administering reward or punishment exceeds any expected benefits from inducing greater cooperation in future interactions. This version of social preferences is more complex to model than altruism, since "history" in the form of one's partners' past actions must be built into an individual's preferences. It is also important to distinguish reciprocation as an action ) from reciprocity-desiring preferences. The latter tend to promote the former, but are not the same thing, and are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause reciprocating behavior. Reciprocating behavior may be distinguished between "strong reciprocity" (Gintis, 2000) , motivated in part by an intrinsic desire to reciprocate, and "weak reciprocity" motivated entirely by the expectation of benefits resulting from altering behavior of those with whom one is interacting. Likewise, since any individual's preferences are multi-faceted, the reciprocity-desiring preferences may be outweighed by other preferences in determining actions, depending on the specific conditions.
The final major theorization of social preferences is difference/inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) . Such preferences seek to minimize the difference between one's own welfare and that of other members of the group, originally limited to the case where one's own welfare was lower than that of others in the group (Bolton and Ockenfels, 1991) , but latter expanded to include cases where one's welfare is higher, often referred to as "guilt" vs. "envy" (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005) . In either case, the "reference group" against which an individual compares herself must be defined as well. Inequity aversion will imply that an individual will be willing to suffer losses to her own welfare, if by doing so she will cause gains to those below her or losses to those above her. Hence they amount to a kind of effective negative altruism towards the "haves" and positive altruism towards the "have nots", each defined in relation to self Each of these investigations of social preferences allow for variations among individuals in the extent to which a particular social preference weighs against a preference for personal material welfare. Moreover, to extent that they theorize the origins of these variations, the implicit theory built into them is that the variations are caused by differences in individuals' cultural backgrounds. This in turn has triggered experimental investigation of social preferences that looks specifically at how people from different cultural backgrounds or identity groups vary in the strength of a particular social preference.
Questions about the role of culture and identity in determining action generated literature examining variations in behavior across groups, typically national groups, in controlled experiments. The pioneering experiments of this kind transplanted common experimental treatments such as the "ultimatum game" to 15 relatively small-scale societies (Henrich et al., 2005; Henrich, 2004) . The ultimatum game involves two players, one who proposes how to divide up a fixed amount of goods, and one who either accepts or rejects (in which case neither players get anything). Observation indicate that there is a large amount of variation between societies in what is considered a fair distribution of goods, that patterns of norms do not contrast in any simple fashion with observed patterns in Western societies, and that there appear to be some relationship betweennorms of distribution and experiences within institutions, particularly market-style transactions. A later set of experiments looked primarily at 16 large, industrialized societies, and examined a different kind of game, the "voluntary contribution mechanism with punishment," in which individuals are given the opportunity to contribute an amount of their choosing to the provision of a collective good, and to later penalize those whose contributions are judged to be inappropriate (Herrman et al., 2008) . Again, a wide variation in behavior between societies is noticed, as is a tendency in some societies to punish those whose contribution is too high as well as those whose is too low. Notably, the tendency to punish high contributions correspondsinversely to the strength of legal institutions and political stability.
Culture and Cognition Approaches
The examination of the relationship between culture and individual attitudes and actions has had a long history in American cultural anthropology, where the "culture and personality" paradigm was the dominant from its early days until the 1970s. Its closest descendant, although naturally much different from its anscestor, is the field of psychological anthropology (Bock, 1994; Casey and Edgerton, 2007; Moore and Mathews, 2001 ). These differences are too numerous to mention, but include the much wider breadth and fragmentation (there is nothing approaching a dominant theory or methodology). The use of psychological literature is likewise much broader and eclectic. Within psychological anthropology, the field of cognitive anthropology (D'Andrade, 1995; Garro, 2007; Holland et al., 1998; Quinn, 2005) focuses specifically on determining the internal worldviews of the individuals and groups being studied.
In psychology, the existence of subfields of social psychology called "cross-cultural" (Berry et al., 1997 (Berry et al., , 1997a (Berry et al., , 1997b Matsumoto, 2001; Bond et al., 2006) and "cultural" (Shweder, 2003; Lehman et al., 2004; Kitayama and Cohen, 2007) psychology is often confusing to the newcomer, something that is not helped by the presence of scholars who work in both fields and debate about what separates the two. Even to the expert, "the differences between cross-cultural and cultural psychology are small" (Triandis, 2007: 68) . The most sweeping distinction that is made between the two is that cross-cultural psychology tends to study cultural differences at the aggregate, typically national, level while cultural psychology looks at cultural differences at the individual level, as mediated through structural constraints. Another is that cultural psychology often focuses on identifying mechanisms specific to particular cases, while cross-cultural psychology focuses primarily on identifying dimensions of culture that are transportable across cases.
Finally, in sociology, the emerging field of cognitive sociology (DiMaggio, 1997; Zerubavel, 1997; Cerulo, 2002) has attempted to inject cultural sociology with the methodological innovations associated with the cognitive revolution elsewhere in the social sciences. Classic cultural theories in sociology, influenced greatly by Talcott Parsons, began from the point of view that cultures determine an individual's decision-making process (cognition, cathexis, and evaluation) through the process of socialization (Parsons and Shils, 1951, pp. 10-11) . This tendency was caricatured rather succinctly many years ago by Wrong (1961; see also Barry, 1970) , and while much has changed since the 1960s, cultural theories have generally not made much effort to bridge the micro-macro link, instead drawing a line directly from culture to institutional and structural outcomes. The five academic fields described, being inherently interdisciplinary, do not ignore work that is being done by similar researchers in other disciplines, and indeed the main research questions in psychological and cognitive anthropology overlap greatly with those in cross-cultural and cultural psychology (for a short discussion of their mutual origins, see Shore, 1996: 20) . Furthermore, these fields each face a similar issue, which is how to model the impact of culture on cognition such that its implications for action are clear. As stated in an influential book in psychological and cognitive anthropology, one often-blamed problem with much individual-level theorizing in anthropology has been its origin in "ethnoscience," (Sturtevant, 1964) an approach that was devoted largely to taxonomies and "tended to squeeze the life out of culture by limiting cultural knowledge to abstract classificatory schemata divorced from human action" (Shore, 1996: 35) . Whether or not one accepts this criticism wholeheartedly, one major distinguishing characteristic of recent work in psychological anthropology has been its attempt to build cultural models with clear implications for action.
The solution to this, proposed by a large number of scholars in these fields, but particularly in cognitive anthropology, is that representations of individual-level attitudes should supplement or replace of abstract dimensions and taxonomies with cultural models, which are shared schemas representing empirical reality and its causal relationships, but which can also include values and motives (D'Andrade and Strauss, 1992; Strauss and Quinn, 1998) . In cultural psychology as well, the solution to problem of action is seen increasingly as the representation of individual-level attitudes as consisting of beliefs and values (Shweder, 1996, 20) , the same representation that is seen in the thin rational choice and "cultural choice" theories described in the previous section.
Standpoint Theories
Standpoint theories (Harding, 2004; Hartsock, 1998) can be distinguished from the previous two paradigms in that the assumption that cognition is determined by culture is taken further, and is used to challenge the very basis for conventional philosophies of science. Basically stated, a standpoint theory argues that an individual's structural position provides access to situated knowledge that is not accessible to those who do not share the same position. A particular emphasis is the privilegedness of social knowledge uniquely possessed by dominated and oppressed groups (Smith, 1974; Hartsock, 1983; Rose, 1987) . It avoids the criticism of essentialism by arguing that the feminist standpoint is not genetically determined but acquired through common genderdetermined experiences within a patriarchical society.
Based on Marx's notion of the standpoint of the proletariat from his 18 th Brumaire (Marx, 1852) , the original formulation of feminist standpoint theory sought to use is the concept of standpoint-situated knowledge as a force for resistance against those theorists who were seen as taking androcentric assumptions about humans and using them as as universals in designing social theory. The dominance of feminist thought among contemporary standpoint theories is indicated by the fact that the terms "standpoint theory" and "feminist standpoint theory" are often taken as synonymous. This is understandable given the sheer breadth, depth, and insight of theory arising from the standpoint outlook in feminist studies and its ties to feminist critiques of the scientific method (Keller and Longino, 1996; Kohlstedt and Longino, 1997; Mayberry et al., 2001) .
Nonetheless, it can be argued that this type of perceived equation between "standpoint" and "feminist standpoint"tends to do harm by isolating feminist standpoint theories from other social science work comprising de facto standpoint theories that may be compatible with certain versions of standpoint feminism. Thisis to the mutual detriment of both, reducing opportunities for integration and contribution to the isolation of feminist standpoint theories from other theories of culture and action..
As noted in this paper, much of the current rational choice and psychological anthropology/cultural psychology literatures theories attribute a "privileged" set of beliefs and preferences to a particular group given its structural position. While these may or may not qualify as standpoint theories, depending on the definition, they share it concern with the relationship between structural position, belief, and values. Indeed, it is hard to conceptually separate a group's standpoint from its culture. As D'Andrade put it, culture is a "socially transmitted information pool" (1981: 181-182) . Recognition of this commonality can help not only in providing theoretical integration, but in transforming the anachronistic polemical debates between theorists into a search for common ground.
It can be argued that the main benefit that standpoint theory can gain from engagement with other approaches to culture and action is its further development as a scientific paradigm rather than a meta-scientific theoretical discussion. While its contemporary incarnation was originally proposed as scientific paradigm and methodology to guide research (Harding, 2004: 1) , in practice it has rarely moved beyond meta-theoretical controversy over the nature and extent of the feminist standpoint, and how it relates to other potential standpoints, and well as discussion on how it could affect scientific inquiry. As of yet, despite two decades of discussion, it has not developed its "normal science" component, and there is as of yet very little that can be called "applied standpoint theory" used to explain specific empirical phenomena in the social world.
Indeed, it would be difficult given the current state of the debate, to say what applied standpoint theory might look like. One direction, and perhaps the most consistent with mainstream social science, would be to posit groups of actors, each with its own structural position, and thus each with access to specific information that is not accessible to the other actors. A particular group of actors (oppressed minorities or women) may be said to have specific types of information or even solidarity that can arise only from their own shared experiences in collective action. As a theory, does it need to generate hypotheses that can be tested and confirmed or falsified (avoid dogmatic falsification, of course)? A recent paper presented at the American Sociological Association conference indicates what this might look like (Harnois, 2008) , one in which black women and men were surveyed regarding their attitudes towards oppression. The study found that the effect of ethnicity was substantially larger than that of gender.
Of course, many if not most feminist standpoint theorists might argue that this is not what they mean by the application of standpoint methodology at all, but they have yet to put forward a unified position on the rules for such a methodology, much less created a line of scientific inquiry that would justify the term "paradigm." Engagement of standpoint theory with choice-theoretic and cognitive approaches can help to aid in this development, since these other approaches have been much more active in building an applied component to their meta-theorizing, generating explanations and predictions of actions that can be compared against real-world events.
On the other hand, what other approaches lack is the ability to internalize the cultural viewpoint of their subjects, a major focus of contemporary standpoint theories. Mainstream social science has often been criticized for clothing political viewpoints under the label of objectivity, disinterested assumptions, hence providing them with a spurious kind of separation from the realworld outlooks of their authors. This accusation is no doubt true-it is very difficult to think of a theoretical assumption, including that of self-regarding material welfare maximization or beliefs from "information," that does not in some way reflect the world view of its authors.
One way to separate this is to provide the subject with the means to design the architecture of her own response, that is, to not impose arbitrary parameterizations on the subject's ideas, yet allow for responses that can be used to make comparisons across groups. Standpoint theories take seriously the provision that one should query the viewpoint of the subjects on their own terms, rather than impose some outside structure. While they have scholars have largely contented themselves with meta-theoretical debate about the advisability of taking such a viewpoint, they need to proceed ahead, developing a method for application that scholars can take into the field and use to conduct studies.
Perhaps the major internal critique of standpoint theory is that it typically fails to recognize the cultural diversity that exists among women, tending instead to assign them a single "female" standpoint. On the other hand, attempts to recognize the multiplicity of women's experiences leads to a kind of postmodernist relativism in which all standpoints are different and have equal validity, which dilutes the notion that women's standpoints are privileged compared to those of men (Hekman, 2004) . However this problem is the very problem that is faced by the two other large bodies of work, which is to examine how group-level culture can be represented at the individual level, and how individual variation can be recognized without erasing the notion that groups share certain common values and beliefs. Moreover, it then segues into the problem of how that representation at the individual can be used to predict action that has meaning at the aggregate level.
